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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN POLICE POWER FURTHER AID TO CHILD WHILE MOTHER CONTINUES IN

STATE

STATUTE DENIES

IMMORAL RELATIONSHIPS

-Many states have expressed concern about aid to illegitimate children, especially
to those born while the mother is receiving state assistance for other children. The
opinion that aid to dependent children (A.D.C.) is in this situation subsidizing
immorality and in effect granting a bounty for illegitimate children has become
widespread. The drain on state treasuries for A.D.C., coupled with the general
increase in state expenditures, has precipitated state action. Louisiana, after enacting one plan to remove A.D.C. from certain illegitimates,' put into effect, on
July 7, 1960, the following provision:
Any other provisions of this Section to the contrary notwithstanding,
no assistance shall be granted to a child living with its [sic] mother, if
the mother has had an illegitimate child after receiving assistance from
the department of public welfare, unless and until proof satisfactory to
the parish board of public welfare has been presented showing that the
mother has ceased
illicit relationships and is maintaining a suitable home
1
for the children.

The probable purpose of this provision was the elimination of financial benefits
to mothers of illegitimate children. But, under the statute, it is the child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, who will be penalized by the loss of aid. The validity
and wisdom of such a provision is questionable.
Each state has made some provision for the care of needy children. The
federal government has agreed to support these plans under the terms of Title IV
of the Social Security Act.- This support is only given to states whose plans have
been approved by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The department has stated that it will not approve the Louisiana provision, and threatens to

order the state to show cause4 why federal funds should not be cut off. 5
To end federal aid, the Secretary must find that the plan or its administration
imposes a residence requirement prohibited by section 602(b) of Title 42,6 or
that there has been a failure to comply substantially with a provision of section
602 (a) of Title 42. Because no residential requirement is included in the Louisiana
provision, the only ground upon which the Secretary may suspend federal money
is a deviation from the terms of section7 602(a), a provision which the Louisiana
legislature has apparently fully satisfied.
§ 46:233(c) (Supp. 1960):
In no instance shall assistance be granted to an illegitimate child if the
mother of the illegitimate child in question is the mother of two or more
illegitimate children unless it should be determined that the conception and

1

LA. R Ev. STAT.

2

birth of such child was due to extenuating circumstances over which
the mother had no control. This provision is not intended to preclude an
illegitimate child from receiving assistance if the child is already receiving
assistance prior to the effective date of this Act, or if the child is the first
or second illegitimate child born to the mother of the child in question.
Until such time as the immediately foregoing provision is approved for
federal participation by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department, the provision shall not be effective.
LA. R y. STAT. § 46:233(d) (Supp. 1960).

3 70 Stat. 848 (1956), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (1959).

4 See 106 CONG. REc. A41918 (daily ed. June 9, 1960), remarks of Rep. Everett to
the effect that the Department has never approved a state plan of this nature.

5 67 Stat. 631 (1953), 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1959).
6 Ascu, SOCIAL SECURITY AND RELATED WELFARE PROGRAMS 84 (rev. ed. 1957).
7 67 Stat. 631 (1953), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1959). This paragraph provides that a
state plan for A.D.C. must provide that: it be in effect in all political subdivisions of the
state; it be supported financially by the state; a single agency be set up to administer or
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It may be argued that the effect of Louisiana's provision is contrary to the
purpose of the federal grant.8 But Congress has neither included standards for
eligibility in section 602, nor provided for the imposition of standards by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as a prerequisite to federal aid.
Therefore, it will be presumed that Congress left such decision-making to the sound
discretion of the state legislatures. 9
Although the mother's argument that the provision is contrary to the purpose
of the grant will not lie with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the
dependent child could prevail on an analogous basis.
The child's argument might be based on a denial of equal protection because
of an unreasonable classification made by the Louisiana legislature. The Louisiana
Bill of Rights does not contain an "equal protection" clause, but its "due process"
clause'0 has been held to safeguard the rights guaranteed under the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.L" The constitutionality of the
A.D.C. provision could, therefore, be successfully challenged under both the state
and the federal constitutions.
It has often been held that pensions, compensation allowances, and privileges
are gratuities given by the state or federal government, and that no "vested" right
is created in the person benefited.' 2 The grant may be withdrawn or redistributed
at any time without subjecting the legislature to further payments. A.D.C. has also
been included in this category as a gift from the state upon terms and conditions
approved by the legislature." "The theory of the American political system is
that the citizen supports the State not the reverse." 14
Cases challenging legislation as violative of the equal protection clause do not
depend on whether the right is vested or not. When a state has used public funds
supervise administration of the plan; opportunity be given anyone denied aid for a hearing
before the agency; methods of administration be used as the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare shall direct; the agency make reports as required by the Secretary; the agency
take into consideration other income and resources in determining need of the child; safeguards against disclosure of information about applicants be available; anyone desiring
A.D.C. may apply; notice to law enforcement agencies of parental desertion shall immediately
issue; no aid shall go to one receiving old age pensions; and, a description of other services
of the State, if any, designed to maintain and strengthen family life be available to the public.
See also DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE UNDER THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

18-20 (1957).

70 Stat. 848 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1959); DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4:
The purpose of the program [A.D.C.] is to enable needy children who are
deprived of parental support or care to have the economic support and
services they need for health and development, to assure for them an opportunity to grow up in their own family setting, to receive an education that
will help them to realize their capacities, and to share in neighborhood and
community living. In these ways the program supports and strengthens
family life.
9 DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, op. Cit. supra note 7, at 18-19:
The purpose of the State's plan is to establish . . . a mutual understanding
as to the legal and administrative conditions of the State's operation and
the criteria governing its decisions: . . . (4) to provide a basis on which
the State can proceed with its operation with security that grants will
continue so long as operation is in substantial compliance with provisions
required by the Act to be included in the plan; (5) to enable States to
develop individual plans which include the required provisions to secure
Federal aid, but are suited to diverse conditions and resources in each State
and to the stage of development of their public welfare program.
10 LA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
11 Simmons v. City of Shreveport, 221 La. 902, 60 So. 2d 867 (1952).
12 See e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934); United States v. Tiller,
107 U.S. 64 (1882).
13 Ambrose v. State Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 319 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Mo.
1958).
14 Newland v. Child, 73 Ida. 530, 254 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1953).
8
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to provide service which it was under no legal obligation to provide, it has been
held to have created a "personal" right which must be made available to all.15
This personal right has not been limited to cases involving racial discrimination. In
Collins v. State Bd. of Social Welfare,16 the court held that, although the child's
right to A.D.C. was purely statutory, because there was no common law or constitutional duty resting on the state, a beneficiary of the plan could still challenge
the constitutionality of a provision reducing his assistance. The court said:
It is a right which may be extended, diminished, conditioned or abrogated

by the legislature and one who asserts rights to assistance thereunder must
comply with all reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions therein
imposed .......
but if it fails to include and affect alike all persons of
the same class, and extends immunities or privileges to one portion and
denies them to others of like kind, by unreasonable or arbitrary sub-classification, it comes within the constitutional prohibition against class legislation." 17

Where unusual discrimination is involved, as is herein contended, the court should
carefully determine whether it is obnoxious to the equal protection clause.' s If
a deliberately invidious discrimination is found to have been created by the provision, then the court should find a denial of constitutional right. 9 Equal protection depends on whether the legislature has made
20 a classification reasonably related
to the purposes of the act in which it is found.
The purpose of A.D.C. is to help needy children achieve normal home lives.
It aims at encouraging personal parental care of the child, and maintaining and
strengthening the family relationship. 21 Crowley v. Bressler 2 expresses this concept:
[C]hild welfare legislation . . . was enacted primarily for the purpose of
retaining home conditions and home atmosphere for dependent children.
The ideal sought was to keep and preserve the social, the spiritual and
physical gains for children as obtained by them from their parents. The
interest of the child has been paramount. . . . Regard must be had for the
mental, physical and moral welfare of the child.
The spirit of such legislation is . . . to preserve the independence
and morale of the child by keeping him in as nearly a normal family environment as possible.

In the words of the Supreme Court of Iowa, the subject of the classification made by
the legislature in providing A.D.C. is the needy child in a certain environment, the
home:
We think it clear that under the provisions of said Chapter the classification adopted by the legislature is the needy child which is diversified from
all needy children by limiting it to the needy child who is residing
in the
23
home of a relative. It is a proper and reasonable classification.

The statute herein considered makes a further classification. It stops payments
for needy older children when the mother bears an illegitimate child while receiving
A.D.C. payments. This subclassification in no way implements the purposes of
the program. On the contrary, it ignores the ideals and spirit of child welfare
legislation, which is designed to assist needy children. The child whose mother
has borne an illegitimate child is more needy than ever. Such legislation may well
15

Brown v. Bd. of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Beal v. Holcome, 193

F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), aff'd 223 F.2d 93, modified 350 U.S. 879 (1955).

16

248 Ia. 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957).

17 Id. at 7-8.
18 Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928).
19 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
20 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67
(1948); Howlett v. Social Security Commission, 347 Mo. 784, 793, 149 S.W.2d 806, 812
(1941): In an old age assistance benefits case, the court said: "[A]s long as the principle of
classification is a reasonable one, the legislature may deny them to one class while granting
them to another ... "
21 Supra, note 8.
22 41 N.Y.S. 2d 441, 445 (1943).
23 Collins v. State Bd. of Social Welfare, 81 N.W.2d 8 (1957).
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physical needs and creeping
result in the deterioration of family spirit, increased
24
feelings of inferiority and insecurity in the child.
That the primary concern of child welfare legislation is the child himself, and
not the accidental conditions of his birth-or the birth of his brothers and sisters
further demonstrated by cases arising under old age pension laws.25 The
-is
attitude towards benefit payments is expressed in dicta from Wilkie v. O'Connor:2
Another of appellant's arguments is entirely fallacious. In his brief he says
that to a man who has "lived a good life for sixty-five years . .. this old
age assistance statute should be viewed in the light of a reward." There
is nothing in the record to show that appellant has lived a "good life."
In any case his old age pension is not given as a reward, it is given to
satisfy a human need regardless of the kind of life the man has lived....

In the pension cases, as in this situation, the purpose of the legislation is to
provide for a needy person in a certain environment. The child, legitimate or
illegitimate, and regardless of his mother's sexual activity, remains a needy person.
So long as he remains needy and is living with his mother, he is within the class
sought to be provided for by A.D.C. His status as a needy human being demands
first consideration; his legitimacy-or the legitimacy of his brothers and sisters-

has no reasonable relationship to this need for material support.
The real purpose of this provision, like that in Collins v. State Bd. of Social
Welfare,27 is economic. But Collins holds that the saving of state funds is no justi-

fication for distinguishing between members of a class, each of whom is the object
of a particular legislative investment. Nor will it be sufficient for the state to say
that every evil need not be reached by social legislation 2s to make a classification
reasonable. While this is true as a broad proposition, it is likewise true that a law

.must reach all those within the class which the purpose of the law indicates.
A court, after carefully considering the provision, and then comparing the
effect of the statute with the aims of A.D.C., should find that eliminating aid to
innocent children is neither reasonable nor prudent.
A recent study by the Social Security Administration supports this conclusion.2 9
The Administration's findings rebutted the presumption that federal-state aid to
dependent children increased illegitimacy. The report stated that only 13 per cent
of the illegitimate children in the United States are on A.D.C. rolls (the other 87
per cent are supported by parents, adoptive parents or relatives). The average
length of time that aid was received was two and a half years. Only 20 per cent
of the aid was going to unwed mothers and more than 15 per cent of these were
working full or part time. "In view of these facts," the report noted, "it would be
surprising if the motivating factor in repeated pregnancies out of wedlock were the
mother's desire to increase her assistance payments to cover part of the basic cost
of rearing another child." s0
24

Brown v. Bd. of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954): "To separate [Negro

children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone."
25 See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. City of Green Bay, 249 Wis. 90, 23 N.W.2d 487 (1946),
where an indigent was awarded payments although his sons were required by law to support
him and were able, if not willing, to do so; Los Angeles County v. La Fuente, 129 P.2d 378
(Cal. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 698 (1942), rehearings denied, 318 U.S. 798, 318 U.S. 800,
318 U.S. 802, 319 U.S. 778, 319 U.S. 783 (1943), where aid was granted a mother who had
declined an offer of assistance from her daughter. The emphasis in such cases is placed most
heavily upon the necessity that the indigent have support. The method is a secondary consideration.
26 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619-20 (1941).
27 81 N.W.2d 4, 9 (Iowa 1957).
28 Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29, 34, 295 N.W. 75, 79 (1940).
29 N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1960, p. 30, col. 1.
30 Ibid. Listed as causes for the rise in the illegitimate birth rate were parents' lack of
integration into generally accepted American culture; more tolerant attitudes toward illicit sex
relations; changes in patterns of family life, including "going steady" at an early age; improved
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Admittedly, the financing of state-wide A.D.C., even with federal support, is
so large that abuses must be kept at a minimum. There are alternatives other than
the one chosen by Louisiana. Probably the most progressive of these has been
taken recently in Tennessee, where a provision similar to Louisiana's had been
vetoed.3 1
When the parent or parents in Tennessee have failed to provide a stable moral
home life for a child who is receiving assistance, the Department of Public Welfare
has a legal responsibility to protect the child through the juvenile courts.3 2 Welfare
workers are to exhaust every resource in attempting to correct home life; but if
all else fails, they are to initiate action which will result in removal of the child
to a foster home or institution. 33 When a child is removed, of course, assistance
ends.34 Having an illegitimate child while receiving assistance payments is prima
facie evidence of failure to provide a stable moral environment.33 It should be
noted that this plan has been approved by the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare.3 6
The Tennessee plan may fail, however, if the welfare worker does not use
the available remedies to their best advantage. In the past, the welfare workers'
37
reluctance to institute proceedings against offenders has been severely criticized.
Prompt and thorough action is essential if unstable homes are not to multiply
illegitimacy. But action under the Tennessee statute has the virtue of attempting
to minimize abuses of the program without penalizing the child beyond withdrawing him from a home which, under the statutory presumption, is not a fit place
for him.
The solution to the problem may not be widely effected in the near future.
Using the Tennessee plan, however, and strengthening it with criminal statutes
punishing parental neglect of financial responsibility, sexual promiscuity and prostitution, 8 should clear up many immediate problems. Future study and education
will be necessary to continue any present advances. Whatever the steps taken by
state legislatures, punishment should be imposed on erring parents, not on children
whose only fault is that they are the victims of circumstance.
Anthony T. Bruno
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLITICAL PARTIES-STATE STATUTE REQUIRING THAT
CANDIDATES BE MEMBERS OF Two YEARS' STANDING IN THEIR PARTIES IS A VALID
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWERE. J. Crowells, a prospective candidate to office

in the state of Florida, challenged the validity of a provision of the Florida Primary
Election Law' requiring every candidate for nomination to any office to take and
subscribe in writing to an oath or affirmation stating that he had not registered
health conditions, including fewer miscarriages and stillbirths. The conclusion was that a
broader program of prevention and correction was needed, that termination of A.D.C. payments
was no solution. See, generally, BURNS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 86-89 (1956).

31

106 CONG. REc. A4919 (daily ed. June 9, 1960).
TENN. REV. STAT. 37:242-744 (Supp. 1960).
33 106 CONG. REC. A4959-60 (daily ed. June 13, 1960), from editorial of the Nashville
Banner, published April 21, 1960, read into Record by Rep. Robert A. Everett of Tennessee.
34 Ibid.
35 106 CONG. REc. A4919 (daily ed. June 9, 1960), letter from Mrs. C. Frank Scott, Commissioner of Tennessee's Department of Public Welfare, read into the Record, with favorable
comment by Rep. Everett.
36 106 CONG. REC. A4919 (daily ed. June 9, 1960), remarks of Rep. Everett.
37 106 CONG. REC. 7017 (daily ed. April 7, 1960), letter from Judge Virgil Langtry to
Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, attacking the policies of welfare workers in Portland,
Oregon.
38 See e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § § 2A:88-1, 110-1, 133-1.

32
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FLA. STAT. ANN.

§

99.021 (1960).
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as a member of any other political party during the two years immediately preceding
the date of such oath. From an adverse decree of the Circuit Court, Broward
County, the prospective candidate appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida.
Held: affirmed. The requirement of two years' registration within the party as a
condition precedent to becoming a candidate of that party is a reasonable regulation and does not contravene any requirements of the federal or state constitutions; it contributes directly to the maintenance of party loyalty and the perpetuation of American political life. Crowells v. Petersen, 118 So. 2d 539 (Fla.
1960).
The immediate issue in this case is whether a state statute, which requires
every candidate for nomination to any office to take a party loyalty oath, is valid
in light of the federal constitution; more broadly, the case raises a question as to
whether perpetuation of the American party system is a legitimate end for the
exercise of state legislative power.
Suffrage
That a state has the power to affix reasonable regulations concerning the qualifications of candidates is uniformly accepted as being in accord with the Constitution of the United States. 2 This power flows from the right of states to regulate
suffrage and to determine the class of inhabitants who may vote,3 subject to the
federal constitutional guarantees as to race, color, and previous condition of servitude.4 Each state may define the right to vote in its own constitution or empower
its legislature to do so.' The right of suffrage is not a natural right of the citizen, 6
but a franchise dependent upon law, by which it must be conferred to permit its
exercise. 7 The states have derivative power to initiate reasonable regulations concerning the nomination of party candidates for office,8 through the state legislatures
or state constitutions, and, unless primary election laws contravene federal constitutional provisions, they will be controlling on all political parties and candidates. 9
Police power
Political parties were not, it would seem, contemplated by the original drafters
of the Constitution. But so potent have they become in determining the administration of government that they are now regarded as inseparable from, if not essential
to, a republican form of government.' 0 A proper administration of the affairs of
a sovereign state vitally affects the welfare of its citizens, and parties have a crucial
effect on administration. Where a matter of such importance is at stake, the state
has the ability, under the police power vested in its legislature, to make reasonable
regulations for the nomination of candidates."
While the states have the power to enact primary election laws, they must
be reasonable regulations7 2 In Crowells, the court held that the requirement of
the party loyalty oath under the existing statute was a reasonable3 legislative regulation, an attitude which has been accepted by numerous courts.'
Some question has been raised as to the violation of the secret ballot which
such a fealty test causes by allowing the voting record of an individual to become
public knowledge. It has been well settled, however, that such a test in no manner
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

E.g., State v. Felton, 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85 (1908).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
Meyers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
Kineen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 11 N.E. 916 (1887).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
Scown v. Czarnecki, 264 II. 305, 106 N.E. 276 (1914).
Mairs v. Peters, 52 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1951).
Id. at 794.
See Crowells v. Petersen, 118 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1960).
Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714 (1901).
Mairs v. Peters, 52 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1951).
E.g., Mairs v. Peters, supra note 12, and cases cited therein.
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violates statutory provisions for the secrecy of the ballot, for "it is the secrecy of
the ballot which the law protects and not secrecy as to the political party with which
the voters intend to act." '4 The authorities hold that participation by an individual in a primary election, either as a voter or as a candidate, is entirely voluntary
on his part; by entering the primary, he voluntarily subjects himself to the party's
reasonable rules and regulations."5
Political parties- associations of voters believing in certain principles of government -are
formed to urge the adoption and execution of such principles in
governmental affairs through officers of like beliefs. For many years they were
unrestrained, and as a consequence, evils arose which called for legislative action.
These evils, to be considered later, included non-partisan participation in partisan
proceedings and the influence exerted by party bosses on candidates. While political
parties are still voluntary organizations, they are recognized as acting for the public
interest, a circumstance which subjects them to reasonable regulations.' 6 The
rationale for decisions supporting primary election laws is that a man has a constitutional right to be a partisan; but he has no constitutional right as a nonpartisan
to the benefits of partisanship. Such laws are deemed necessary to preserve the
exclusive organization of political parties.
The fealty test was adopted from voluntary rules of political parties. It was
enacted into law to enable parties to protect themselves from outside influences.'
Primary election laws are not designed to protect a nonpartisan's rights to participate in nominations. The statutes aim to preserve the integrity and usefulness of
political parties by giving to each adherent thereof a free and equal voice in the
selection of candidates and the determination of party principles and policies. This
cannot be accomplished without excluding those who adhere to other parties or
to no party.'8 As the court in Crowells states: "Reasonable restrictions on party
candidates by the state contribute directly to the maintenance of party loyalty and
a perpetuation of the party system."
It was not the purpose of the fealty test in Crowells to indirectly destroy political organizations. However, such destruction would be the logical result if political
parties and the states could not, by some test of affiliation, exclude their opponents
from participation.
A further purpose of the primary election laws was to remove candidates from
the influences of political bosses. This is accomplished either by a provision in
the laws for direct nomination of candidates by the party members, or by their
ratification of candidates selected at representative conventions. 19
The importance of political parties in America was considered by Alexis De
Tocqueville, who viewed the then existing political parties with an unfriendly eye
because of their passions and prejudices. He stated that:
Parties are a necessary evil in free governments ....
At certain periods a
nation may be oppressed by such insupportable evils as to conceive the
design of effecting a total change in its political constitutions; at other times
the mischief lies still deeper, and the existence of society itself is endangered.
Such are the times of great revolutions and of great parties. . . . The
political parties which I style great are those which cling to principles more
than to consequences;
to general and not to special cases; to ideas and
20
not to men.
Another distinguished foreign critic, Lord Bryce, viewing our political organization
in more recent times, said:
In America the great moving forces are the parties. The spirit and force

of party has in America been an essential to the action of the machinery of
14 Lett v. Dennis, 221 Ala. 432, 129 So. 33, 34 (1930).
15 State v. Michel, 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430 (1908).
16 Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789 (1919).
17 Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.W. 987 (1916).
18 Ibid.
19 Riter v. Douglas, 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444 (1919).
20 DE ToCUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AmERICA 187 (1837).
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government as steam is to a locomotive engine; or to vary the simile, party
association and organization are to the organs of government almost what
the motor nerves are to the muscles, sinews, and bones of the human
body. Political parties transmit the motive power. They determine the
directions in which the organs act. A description of them is therefore a
necessary complement to an account of the Constitution and government,
for it is into the hands of parties that the working of the government has
fallen. Their ingenuity, stimulated by incessant rivalry, has turned many
provisions of the Constitution to unforeseen ones, and given to2 1 the legal
institutions of the country no small part of their present color.

It is not to be expected that all the hopes of the founders of the American
Constitution would be fulfilled. They do not seem to have been prepared for the
rapid development of political parties, nor the thorough organization which the
American parties soon provided for themselves. The Crowells court in considering
the validity of the party loyalty oath, and primary election laws in general, seems
to emphasize protecting the American party system. The inference is that future
courts will continue to protect this system and uphold primary election laws.
That the party system in America is vital is unquestioned. Parties are essential
to the effective operation of government. Regulations of parties by the states is
founded on the police power and the derivative power possessed over suffrage.
The regulations, to be valid, must not conflict with federal or state constitutions.
They must be reasonable. The plaintiff in Crowells, therefore, was not denied a
constitutional right. The inference is that his political rights were preserved by
perpetuating the party system through primary election laws.
Robert W. Cox

SCOPE OF REVIEW IN JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS - Three
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have clarified somewhat
the scope of review permitted a district court on petitions to specifically enforce
arbitration agreements or awards.
In United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.,1 the union
petitioned the district court to compel arbitration of a grievance concerning the
reinstatement of a union member. Two weeks before applying for reinstatement
with the company the worker was awarded a workmen's compensation payment,
part of which was for a permanent disability. It was the union's position that the
worker was physically able to return to work, that he was entitled to reinstatement
under the seniority provisions of the contract and that the claim was arbitrable
under the broad language of the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the claim was
not arbitrable. Considering the heavy physical character of the work, it found the
union's claim that the member was now physically able to work to be "frivolous,
patently baseless." 2 The Supreme Court reversed.
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,3 the union petitioned the district court to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the subcontracting of maintenance work by the company. The union claimed that this
practice constituted a partial lockout, in violation of the prohibition of lockouts
in the collective bargaining agreement. The company claimed that this dispute
was not arbitrable under an arbitration clause which excluded "matters which are
strictly a function of management." It presented evidence showing that the subject of sub-contracting was considered a function of management by the negotiaLABOR LAw-ARBITRATION-

OF PROMISES

21

1

TO

ARBITRATE

IN

BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH

1 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
2
3

COLLECTIVE

264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959).
363 U.S. 574 (1960).

636.
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tors who wrote the contract. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the dispute was not arbitrable. Again the Supreme Court reversed.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,s the
union petitioned the court to enforce an arbitration award granting reinstatement
and back pay to certain union members discharged by the company for conducting
an allegedly illegal walkout. The arbitrator granted back pay from the time of
discharge to the date of reinstatement, although the collective bargaining agreement had expired. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
award could only be enforced up to the termination date of the contract.8 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitrator had authority under the contract to fashion the remedy given.
Congress, in Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,7 and the
Supreme Court, in its Lincoln Mills" decision, assigned to the federal courts the
task of interpreting arbitration promises in collective bargaining agreements. Few
standards were given to federal judges to help them fashion, by "judicial inventiveness" a national labor law. Section 301 provided no standards.9 The Court in
Lincoln Mills revealed that the sources of the new law were to be the policy of
the national labor law, the other sections of the Act, the "penumbra of express
statutory mandates," and state law insofar as it was consistent with federal policy. 10
It is not surprising that federal judges, unaccustomed as most of them were with
"judicial inventiveness," relied heavily upon the common law.
At common law, while arbitration agreements were viewed as legal contracts,
no practical remedy was given for their enforcement. The only remedy available
for the breach of an executory arbitration contract was an action at law for damages. The damages in such a case were limited to the cost, if any, which the injured
party incurred in preparing his case for arbitration. Specific performance was
universally denied.' 1
Arbitration awards, on the other hand, are enforceable at common law. 12 They
are in theory subject to a very limited review by the enforcing court. They are
not to be set aside except for fraud, corruption, or mistake so gross as to amount
to fraud. 13 It is recognized that arbitrators are not usually lawyers and they have
no obligation to apply the law.' 4 Courts, however, while stating that the general
principle is non-interference in the arbitration process, frequently set aside awards
upon a finding that the arbitrator has gone beyond the issues submitted to him, 3
or has not decided all that was submitted to him.16
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959).
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959).
Labor Management Relations Act. § 301, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1956).
See dissenting opinion, id. at 460-546.
Id. at 457. For an illustration of the possibility of varied decisions under such standards

see Refinery Employees v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723 (W. D. La. 1958), where
the district judge quite logically came to different conclusions than the Supreme Court in the

instant cases.
11 McCullough v. Clinch-Mitchell Constr. Co., 71 F.2d 17, 22 (8th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 582 (1934) (dictum); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1919 (rev. ed. 1938);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 550 (1932).
12 Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929); Burchell
v. March, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1855).
13 Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., supra note 12; Continental Milling & Feed
Co. v. Doughnut Corp., 186 Md. 169, 48 A.2d 447 (1946); Motor Haulage Co. v. Teamsters Union, 272 App. Div. 382, 71 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1947).
14 J. F. Fitzgerald Constr. Co. v. Southbridge Water Supply Co., 304 Mass. 130, 23
N.E.2d 165 (1939); King v. Falls of Neuse Mfg. Co., 79 N.C. 360 (1878).
15 Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp., 186 Md. 169, 48 A.2d 447
(1946); Fernandez & Hnos. v. Rickert Rice Mills Inc., 119 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1941); Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
16 Boot Mills v. Bd. of Conciliation & Arbitration,'311 Mass. 223, 40 N.E.2d 870 (1942).
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Arbitration statutes have abolished the common law in almost all states. These
statutes in general provide for specific enforcement of executory arbitration agreements, stays of legal actions brought in violation of arbitration agreements, and
summary proceedings for the enforcement of arbitration awards.1 7 However, many
of these statutes specifically exclude, or have been judicially construed to exclude,
collective bargaining agreements. The result is that collective bargaining arbitration agreements are enforceable in only a minority of the states. s
The harmful effect of the common law has been not so much the specific rules
but a judicial attitude born out of decisions dealing with contracts quite different
from collective bargaining agreements. Courts have generally, in recent times at
any rate, approved of arbitration as a quick, inexpensive way of settling disputes.0 9
But, while arbitration is a good thing for those who choose that method of settling
disputes, it would be unconscionable to force that method upon a litigant and
thereby deprive him of the protection of the courts. 20 This consideration has given
rise to the rule that an arbitrator has authority to decide only those issues that are
clearly and unmistakably submitted to him in the arbitration agreement. 1
Another rule restraining arbitrators was developed by the New York courts
in dealing with petitions for specific enforcement of arbitration agreements under
the New York statute.22 The Cutler-Hammer or "plain meaning" doctrine is that
"the mere assertion by a party of a meaning which is clearly contrary to the plain
meaning of the words cannot make an arbitrable issue." 23 The rule has the apparent
advantage of common sense, and seems to be an application of the maxim: Equity
will not force a party to do a useless act. The rule, however, violates the intention
of the parties when contracts call for arbitration of all disputes and make no distinction between serious and frivolous disputes. The rule encourages judicial intervention. It is the judge who must determine what claims are frivolous. The court
must interpret contracts whose terms clearly provide that interpretation is assigned
to an arbitrator.
These doctrines, while rarely expressly advocated 24 by federal courts in dealing
with cases brought under Section 301, appear to have been followed in varying
degrees. There is a tendency among some federal judges to strictly construe arbitration agreements, limiting the arbitrator's authority to the specific language of
17 See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RoCKy MT. L.
REv. 247, 250 (1958); see also Federal Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. § 1-14
(1958).
18
CH LAB. L. REP., Union Contracts Arbitration 57,034, lists the states which give

effect to arbitration agreements in labor contracts: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. However, see
Volunteer Electric Co. v. Gann, 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,537 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1960), and Local
774 v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 186 Kan. 569, 352 P.2d 420 (1960) holding that arbitration
agreements are enforceable under § 301 in the state courts.
19 As early as 1855 it was said by the United States Supreme Court in Burchell v.
March, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349: "Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide
matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes it
should receive every encouragement from courts of equity."
20 Fernandez & Hnos. v. Rickert Rice Mills Inc., 119 F.2d 809, 815 (1st Cir. 1941);
Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp., 186 Md. 169, 48 A.2d 447 (1946).
21 Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp., supra note 20; see In re Kelly,
240 N.Y. 74, 147 N.E. 363 (1925) where it is said, at 364: "The contract, however, must
be to arbitrate the precise matter as to which arbitration is sought."
22 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 1448-1469 (1955).
23 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317, 318, aff'd 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947); in accord, Standard Oil Dev.
Co. Employees' Union v. Esso Research & Engineering Co., 38 N.J. Super., 106, 118 A.2d
70, aff'd on rehearing, 38 N.J. Super. 293, 118 A.2d 712 (1955).
24 But see Refinery Employees v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. La. 1958)
where the dominant consideration was determined to be not forcing a party into arbitration
of an issue that he had not voluntarily consented to arbitrate.
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the contract.25 In other cases, matters have been excluded from arbitration by
broad construction of exclusionary provisions in the contract. 2 In many Section
301 controversies, judges, by looking into the merits of
the cases, have in effect
27
followed the approach of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine.
It is true that a court must to some extent interpret the contracts brought
before it. 25 While it might be better policy for the arbitrator to be the sole judge
of arbitrability, 29 since arbitration is based on a consensual relation, the issue must
ultimately be for the court. A party is only bound to arbitrate because he has
30
promised to do so; the court must determine if the promise has been made.
But in interpreting collective bargaining agreements, a different approach
must be taken than in the interpretation of the usual business contracts0 ' There
must be a unique judicial approach, because the collective bargaining agreement is
a unique species of contract.
One of the reasons expressed for construing arbitration agreements strictly
against arbitration is that arbitration deprives the party of the established court
procedures and trial by jury. It is rightly said that this right should not be taken
away by implication 2 But in a labor dispute the alternative to arbitration is not
a trial; it is a strike. It is not a jury, but human suffering and economic waste.
The reasons of policy weigh heavily for arbitration.
Labor contracts should be interpreted liberally because the parties intend them
to be liberally construed. They are, unlike the business contract, made to cover
more than a single transaction. They are made between parties who are interdependent. The employer-employee relationship existed prior to the labor agreement;
it is a matter of survival to both management and labor that the relationship
continue to exist. Both parties are under enormous pressure to come to some
25 See Independent Petroleum Workers v. Standard Oil Co., 275 F.2d 706 (7th Cir.
1960); Employees Ass'n v. Procter & Gamble, 172 F. Supp. 210 (D. Kan. 1959); Kroger
Co. v. Local 347, Meat Cutters, 41 L.R.R.M. 2545 (S.D.W. Va. 1958); for cases limiting
arbitrator's power to fashion remedies to the language of the contract see Lodge 12, District
37, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, 183 F. Supp. 144, 148, (S.D. Tex.
1960); Refinery Employees' Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 896 (1959).
26 Local 149, American Fed'n of Fed. Engineers v. General Electric Co., 250 F.2d 922
(1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nay. Co., 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959).
27 See Sunnyvale Westinghouse Salaried Employees Ass'n v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
175 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1959), afl'd per curiam, 276 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1960); Local
201 v. General Electric Co., 262 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1959); Local 386, Dairy Workers Union
v. Grand Rapids Milk Division, 160 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mich. 1958).
28 This problem was recognized and discussed in two cases. In Engineers' Ass'n v. Sperry
Gyroscope Co., 251 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1957), the court resolved the problem by demanding a lesser quantum of proof than would be required by the court if it were to adjudicate the issue fully. In New Bedford Defense Prod. Div. v. Local 1113, 258 F.2d 522, 526
(1st Cir. 1958), the court resolved the problem by saying: "In this respect we think that
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, whose judgment is involved in the collective bargaining
agreement instead of that of the court, is similar to a court's jurisdiction. If the subject matter of a claim is within the court's jurisdiction, the court does not lose its jurisdiction because
of the fact that the proper disposition of the claim may be crystal-clear under the law.
Indeed, if, in the present case, the grievance in question is confined to an arbitrator by the
collective bargaining agreement, the court, in a § 301 proceeding, has no business to concern
itself with a preliminary question whether the answer to the grievance on its merits may or
may not be entirely clear under the language of the agreement."
29 See Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635, 648 (1959).
30 Brass & Copper Workers Union v. American Brass Co., 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959);
Newspaper Guild v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 233 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1956); Local 149,
American Federation of Eng'rs v. General Electric Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
31 See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocxY MT. L.
REV. 247, 262-265 (1958); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARv. L. REv. 999, 1003-1005 (1955).
32 See cases cited supra note 20.
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agreement. They are not two businessmen, each of whom can find another party
to deal with if he is not able to negotiate terms to their satisfaction. In collective
bargaining agreements some terms are purposely kept vague in order to arrive
at an agreement. These terms may have one meaning to one party, another 3mean3
ing to the other. It is assumed that the meaning will be worked out later.
By necessity labor contracts must be incomplete. They are meant to govern
the day-to-day relationships of sometimes thousands of men; it is impossible for
the parties to spell out in detail all that is involved in this relationship. The best
that can be done is to provide an outline with the details to be supplied later, as
specific situations arise. In this sense, a collective bargaining agreement is more like a
charter or a constitution than an ordinary contract. It must be interpreted more
by the "common law of the shop" than by the "plain meaning rule." The man
interpreting the agreement should, therefore, be familiar with the particular industry and the labor conditions involved. He must fill in the gap in the agreement
and develop rules and remedies for situations unforeseen by the negotiators. The
labor arbitrator seems better qualified for this sort of task than a judge is.
The Supreme Court in the instant cases had before it three typical situations
which, in the view of some authorities, judges consistently mishandle. They represented a judicial attitude the Court itself wished to correct. In American Manufacturing Co., the Sixth Circuit expressed a view very similar, if not identical, to the
Cutler-Hammer doctrine.3 4 In the other cases, the Fifth Circuit gave a broad
interpretation to the exclusionary clause in the collective bargaining agreement
before it,35 and the Fourth Circuit limited the arbitrator's development of remedies
to the court's interpretation of the contract.36
Reversing all three cases, the Court held :31
(1) The arbitrability of disputes in collective bargaining agreements is for
the court to determine.38
(2) The interpretation of the contract is for the arbitrator.3 9
(3) The federal courts are directed by Congress to give "full
play" to the
40
means chosen by parties for the settlement of disputes.
(4) The function of the court is limited to determining whether the claim
asserted to be arbitrable is on its face governed by the contract when
the parties have submitted all questions of contract interpretation to
the arbitrator.4 '
(5) A dispute over the interpretation of a contract with a broad arbitration
clause is arbitrable unless:
a) There is an express provision excluding the matter sought to be
arbitrated, or,
b) The most forceful evidence is presented to show that the matter
sought to be arbitrated
was intended to be excluded under a vague
42
exclusionary clause.

More important than the precise holdings of the cases is the "finding of fact"

made by the Court,4 3 which emphasizes the differences between collective bargain33 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 H.Av. L. Rav. 1486, 1490 (1959).
34 264 F.2d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 1959).
35 269 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1959).
36 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959).
37 For another analysis of the Warrior & Gulf opinion see IUOE, Local 725 v. Standard
Oil Co., 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 16,544 (D.N.D. 1960).
38 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
39 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
40 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566.
41 Id. at 567-68.
42 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85.
43
The Court therefore avoids the prescriptions of inflexible rules for the
enforcement of arbitration promises. Guidance is given by identifying the
various considerations which a court should take into account when con-

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ing agreements and ordinary commercial contracts. The Court recognized that
the alternative to arbitration is economic warfare. It recognized also the incompleteness of labor contracts, 44 and the role of the arbitratorA5 in meeting situations
unthought of at the time of negotiation.4 0 It recognized, finally, the expertise of
the arbitrator
and the need for him to be allowed to function without court inter47

ference.

These factors are, in some respects, the rule of the cases; the Court advised
lower courts to consider these
things in determining the arbitrability of future col48
lective bargaining contracts.
Because the opinion of the Court departs from established contract principles,
it has already been criticized as another example of judicial activism.49 These
criticisms are valid only if they are directed principally at the parent of the present
cases, Lincoln Mills.50 There the Court favored the enforcement of arbitration
agreements as a concomitant of the established national policy of industrial peace
through collective bargaining,-" and the decisions in last summer's cases follow
almost necessarily from that commitment. While there remain many unsolved
problems in this area, 52 these decisions have contributed substantially to a substantive meaning for "judicial inventiveness."
Roderick A. Mette
PUBLIC RECORDS-NEwSPAPER'S RIGHT TO INSPECT THE RECORDS OF A
PUBLIC AUTHORITY -PETITION
FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO INSPECT FILES OF
TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY DENIED- Petitioner, the New

York Post, sought a writ of mandamus opening the files of the Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority in order that the petitioner could inspect certain records.
Petitioner claimed that the records were public records and that it was entitled by
statute to inspect them; that there was no reasonable ground for refusing the request;
and that the refusal by the officers of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
to allow inspection violated petitioner's constitutional right of free speech. Respondent contended that there were no legal grounds for granting petitioner's request,

44
45
46
47
48

struing a particular clause-considerations of the milieu in which the
clause is negotiated and of the national policy. Brennan, J., concurring,
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 at 570.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
Id. at 578-801.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 581-82.
See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 at 567.
In our role of developing a meaningful body of law to govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, we think
special heed should be given to the context in which collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to
serve.

49 See concurring opinion of Hale, J. in Volunteer Electric Co-op v. Gann, 41 CCH
Lab. Cas. 16,537 (Tenn. 1960):
The holdings requiring compulsory arbitration even in frivolous cases are
blows at the independence of the judiciary, a further evisceration of the

Tenth Amendment and another long step down the road to state socialism, so roundly condemned by critics of the 'Warren Supreme Court'....
I wish it were different, but the U.S. Supreme Court has obtained
complete mastery over its coeval branches of government and has adopted

the principle of the French Kings, some of whom went to the guillotine,
"le roi le veut" (the King wills it).
50 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1956).
51 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
52 See Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake & Potomac Co., 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 16,543
(D. Md. 1960), where the court was unable to determine from an examination of the
Warrior & Gulf opinion what effect prior negotiation of the issue in dispute should have had
on the determination of its arbitrability.
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either by statute, common law, or constitutional law. Held, the Authority is a
separate legal entity, independent of the state, city, or county, and its records are
not subject to inspection as "public records." New York Post Corp. v. Moses, 204
N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority is a body established by act of
the New York legislature' to build and operate certain facilities for the City of
New York. Among the projects under the Authority's management are the Triborough Bridge, the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, the Queens-Midtown Tunnel, the
Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, the Battery Parking Garage, and the New York Coliseum.
The Authority receives no tax money but is financed through bond issues and
operational revenues. The Authority consists of three members, appointed by the
Mayor of New York City. These board members are forbidden to receive compensation for their services, and are removable from office by the Mayor for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or misconduct. The Authority has full jurisdiction over its
projects and is directed to charge tolls and collect revenues for the benefit of its
bondholders. The Authority is to remain in existence until such time as its indebted2
ness is satisfied, at which time all of its rights and properties pass to the city.
The New York Post, charging the Authority with disregard of the public
interest in its operations, sought to examine its files. To one untrained in the law,
the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority would undoubtedly be identified
with the city government. It was created to manage the construction and operation
of city facilities. An authority carrying on this function would appear to be an
agency of the government, coequal with other departments of the municipality. As
such it should be subject to the same duties and controls as the ordinary governmental agencies- particularly so when the question is public surveillance of its
operations.
New York statutory law regarding inspection of records provides, in Section
66 of the Public Officers Law:
A person, having the custody of the records or other papers in a
public office, within the state, must, upon request, and upon payment of, or
offer to pay, the fees allowed by law, or, if no fees are expressly allowed
by law, fees at the rate allowed to a county clerk for a similar service,
diligently search the files, papers, records, and dockets in his office; and
either make one or more transcripts therefrom, and certify to the correctness thereof, and to the search, or certify that a document or paper, of
which the custody legally belongs to him, cannot be found.

A definition of public records is given in the Education Law of New York, Section
144:
any written or printed book or paper, or map, which is the property
of the state, or of any county, city, town or village or part thereof, and
in or on which any entry has been made or is required to be made by law,
or which any officer or employee of the state or of a county, city, town or
village has received or is required to receive for filing.
...

Petitioner relied, however, on the following declaration, found in Section 51, of
the General Municipal Law of New York:
. . . All books of minutes, entry or account, and the books, bills, vouchers,
checks, contracts or other papers connected with or used or filed in the
office of, or with any officer, board or commission acting for or on behalf
of any county, town, village or municipal corporation in this state are hereby
declared to be public records, and shall be open, subject to reasonable
regulations to be prescribed by the officer having the custody thereof, to
the inspection of any taxpayer.

In the light of these statutory provisions and because of the Authority's popular
identification with the city, there would seem to be no doubt that the petitioner
had a right to inspect the files of the Authority. But the Authority contended that
these statutes were not applicable to it since it is not such a body as is contemplated
in the statutes, but is an entity independent of the city.
1 N.Y. PuB. AUTH. §§ 550-71.
2

Id. § 552.
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The question of the Authority's status had not been previously adjudicated.
But there have been decisions rendered as to the status of similar instrumentalities.
The New York Housing Authority has been held, in Ciulla v. State of New York,3
to be distinct from the state- the agent of neither the state nor the City of New
York.
The status of another public authority was dealt with in Bird v. New York
State Thruway.4 There it was held that the Thruway was not an integral part of
state government but had a separate existence even though performing a governmental function. The corporate entity, stated the court, had been interposed to
protect the state from liability and to allow the Thruway to have freedom from
restraint. Similar was the holding in Plumbing v. New York State Thruway/ to
the effect that, although the Thruway was an "arm of the state," it was not to be
thought that it "was" the state; it enjoyed an existence separate and apart from
the state even though performing a governmental function. In Erenberg v. Brill,6 in
a proceeding wherein a petitioner had sought to examine accident reports kept by
the Thruway, the court held that, in the absence of a requirement that the Thruway
keep such records, they were not public records and therefore not subject to inspection as of right. A different authority was dealt with in Borek v. Golder,7 where
a taxpayer brought suit against officers of the Municipal Housing Authority of
Utica. The court held that the Authority was not an integral part of the city
government but had, instead, an independent corporate entity; and therefore an
action against the officers of the Authority to prevent waste of city funds would
not lie. In re Reynolds8 illustrated the same reasoning, holding that for an action
to lie against officers of a city election board to prevent waste of the funds of the
city, under Section 51 of the General Municipal Law, the act sought to be enjoined
must in some way affect the funds or property of the municipality. The election
board was held to be neither the agent nor servant of the city; it was, the court
said, not acting "for or on behalf of" the city, but for the public in general. Hence
it appears that the New York courts have established the principle that public
authorities are separate, independent entities. 9 This principle has been applied
even though it is admitted that the authority in question performs a governmental
function, 0 or is "an arm of the state,""' an instrumentality of the state or an
"agency." 12 The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority is similar to the agencies
considered in earlier New York cases and probably deserves a similar classification.
According to the Attorney General of New York, the reason for the legislature's
decision to confer this status upon public authorities was to protect the state from
liability and to free the authority from restrictions otherwise applicable to governmental agencies." This rationale has been quoted by the cases, with no further
comment than that of the Plumbing opinion that "these public corporations are
independent and autonomous, deliberately designed to be able to function with a
3 191 Misc. 528, 77 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1948).
4 8 App. Div. 2d 496, 188 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1959).
5 5 N.Y.2d 420, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1959).
6 10 App. Div. 769, 197 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1960).
7 190 Misc. 366, 74 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1947).
8 202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87 (1911).
9 Although the status of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority is a question of
statutory law, it is well to note that other states, in dealing with similar "authorities," under
similar statutes, have also construed the status of these authorities as independent and
autonomous. See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Comm., 105 S.E.2d
630 (W. Va. 1959); Book v. State Office Building Comm., 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273
(1958); Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956).
10 Bird v. N.Y. State Thruway, 8 App. Div. 769, 197 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1960).
11 Easley v. N.Y. State Thruway, 1 N.Y.2d 374, 376, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (1956).
12 Ciulla v. State of New York, 191 Misc. 528, 77 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1948). The court
distinguished between an "agency" and an "agent" here. It held that "agency" is a synonym

for instrumentality, while an "agent" is an "alter ego" of the state.
13

1951 Ops. AT-r'y GEN. 130, 132.
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freedom and flexibility not permitted to an ordinary State Board, department or
commission." '" The rationale, both of the Attorney General and of the judiciary, is
apparently that the independent status of public corporations is a necessity dictated
by their need for freedom and flexibility in fulfilling a public duty-and not a
denial that they are in fact state instrumentalities, with a governmental purpose.
This brings into focus the really central issue in the Triborough case: Does
the fact that the public authority is a separate legal entity demand that it be treated
independently in all respects? The policy considerations for conferring this independent status would not justify such a sweeping application of the idea of autonomy.
The protection of the state from liability and the Authority's freedom from undue
restraint would not necessitate complete separation and independence. It would
be sufficient that its independence be asserted only when necessary to protect its
freedom. A demand to inspect the files of the Authority threatens neither the
flexibility and efficiency of the operation nor the financial security of the state.
There is no blinding reason, therefore, for granting complete independence.
The answer to this question lies in the interpretation of the statute regarding
inspection, Section 51 of the General Municipal Law of New York, quoted above.
There exists in New York a generally recognized policy that statutes granting a
right of inspection of records should be liberally construed. 'This policy was recognized unhesitatingly in Sosa v. Lincoln Hospital's and Sears, Roebuck v. Hoyt.",
And In re Becker, in holding that Section 51 should be liberally construed, stated
that:
The policy of the law favors publicity. The statute we have cited (Sec.
are
51 of the General Municipal Law) proceeds upon the theory that there
7
or should be no confidential records in respect to public business.

To the same effect is Cherkis v. Impelliteri:
Both of these statutory provisions (Sec. 51 of General Municipal Law
and Sec. 894 of the City Charter) were designed to effectuate the salutary
public policy that "The doings of a municipal corporation and the doings of
its officers, and the records and files in their offices must be open to the
public" [citing North v.Foley, 238 App. Div. 731, 734, 265 N.Y.S. 780,
783, "that there are and should be no 8confidential records or communications with respect to public business"].'

Further illustration of the courts' readiness to apply this policy in favor of
inspection is seen in Walker v. Watson, 9 where members of a citizens' budget commission sought to inspect the files of the local civil service commission. The civil

service commission defended against the granting of the petition for a writ of
mandamus on the grounds that it was not a city department and that the budget

commission had no statutory right to examine the records, which were not, they
contended, public records. The court said:
[I]f I should conclude that what petitioner seeks is reasonable and proper
and in the public interest and not prohibited by law, I think there can
be no doubt of my power and duty to grant the relief requested, even if
petitioner does not have specific and absolute statutory right thereto ...
I consequently address to those broader aspects of the matter rather
than to the somewhat technical questions whether respondent is or is not
a "city department," within the meaning of City Charter §894 and whether
the papers sought are "public records" in a strictly legal sense....
The statute which is now section 894 of the City Charter was passed
for the purpose of preventing corruption and mismanagement in the city
government, and its underlying theory is that publicity is a preventive cure
for such evils [citing Matter of Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 748 App.
14 185 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (1959).
15 190 Misc. 448, 74 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1947, aff'd, 273 App. Div. 852, 77 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1948).
16 202 Misc. 448, 74 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1951).
17 200 App. Div. 178, 192 N.Y.S. 754, 757 (1922).
18 124 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (1953), rev'd by the Appellate Division on another ground,
282 App. Div. 816, 124 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1953).
19 201 Misc. 556, 115 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1952), modified, 113 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1952).
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Div. 177, 180, 133 N.Y.S. 129, 131, aff'd, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467]
and even if respondent be right in its contention that the present section
is so worded that by reason of changes in the structure of the city government it does not literally apply to respondent, I do not think that is any
reason for not applying the statute20 in a way which I think is clearly
within its spirit, purpose and intent.

Thus there is a guide to the interpretation of the statute pertaining to this
case. If the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority can be classified as an agency
which acts "for or on behalf of" the City of New York it becomes unquestionably
subject to the right of inspection granted by Section 51 of the General Municipal
Law. The presumption is in favor of a right of inspection, should the pros and
cons of the question be otherwise balanced. In the present case, the New York
County Supreme Court, it seems clear, applied a narrow interpretation of Section
51, in holding that the Authority would have had to have been a strict agent of the
city in order for the petition for mandamus to succeed. The court required, in
the words of the Ciulla decision, that the Authority be an "alter ego" of the city.
But, do the terms "for or on behalf of" necessarily contemplate a strict agency
relationship? Unless this is clearly the meaning of the statute, a liberal construction would require that a relationship less binding than agency would suffice to
bring the Triborough Authority under Section 51. It could be argued with considerable merit that the Authority acts for or on behalf of the city by its performance of functions which are usually considered governmental. Its property will
revert to the city at such time as the indebtedness of the Authority is finally satisfied. 21 Section 553 of the Public Authorities Law of New York enumerates the
powers of the Triborough Authority. Among these are the power "to acquire, in
the name of the city, by purchase or condemnation, real property or rights or easements .... ,,22 The Authority, under the same statute, has power to "sell and
convey or lease in behalf of such city any real property acquired by the city at the
expense of the authority." 23 The city maintains a degree of surveillance over the
activities of the Authority for the obvious purpose of preventing waste of its assets
through mismanagement or corruption.
However, it is not sufficient to base the conclusion that these facts satisfy the
provisions of the statute on common sense arguments. Some indication must be
found within the statute itself that the Authority comes within the purview of
Section 51, and that its records are open to inspection as a matter of right. To do
this, reference must be had to the "for or on behalf of" provision.
The word "for" must be taken to mean, inthe context of this statute, an agency
relationship. In The Iristo,24 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that, where a charterer had signed bills of lading "for master and
others," the charterer was acting as an agent; "for," the court said, generally denotes agency. A similar holding resulted in Marlenee v. Brown.25 "For" in this
opinion was taken to denote "as agent of." 28 Does the Triborough Authority act
for the City of New York? If "for" refers to strict agency and if the holdings in
Cuilla, Bird and Plumbing are conceded to be correct, the Authority probably does
not act for the city.
But the remainder of the Section 51 provision, the "or on behalf of" clause,
must also be considered. Some cases indicate that "for" and "on behalf of" are
identical in meaning.2 7 But this would render senseless the statute here under con20

115 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95, 96.
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22 Id. § 553 (4) (Emphasis added.)
23 Id. § 553 (4-a(b)).
24 43 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
25 128 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1947).
26 See also Rice v. Stove, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 158, 33 Am. Dec. 724 (1839); Emerson
v. Providence Hat Mfg. Co., 12 Mass. 237, 7 Am. Dec. 66 (1815).
27 Hatcher v. Sietz, 87 Ga. App. 789, 75 S.E.2d 273 (1953); Donovan v. Welch, 11
N.D. 113, 90 N.W. 262 (1902).
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sideration. Under such an interpretation, the meaning of Section 51 would be:
"All books... in the office of ... any officer, board, or commission acting as an
agent of or as an agent of any . . . municipal corporation ... are hereby declared
to be public records. . .

."

This would be patent nonsense. Obviously "on behalf

of" was intended to have a meaning different from that of "for."
The statute uses the words "or on behalf of." "Or" is a disjunctive term,
expressing an alternative; it is sometimes interpreted conjunctively but only when
the sense and meaning of the text demand it.2s Here, the context of the statute
demands a disjunctive reading. It is significant that the legislature chose to use
"and" instead of "or" in a similar passage at the opening of Section 51. There
it is provided that "all officers, agents, commissioners and other persons acting, or
who have acted, for and on behalf of any county, town, village or municipal corporation in this state... may be prosecuted." (Emphasis added.) The change in
the choice of words here indicates that the "or" in the latter provision was intended
to have a different meaning than the conjunctive "and." It was intended to
express an alternative. The only reasonable explanation of the meaning of the
provision pertaining to records is that the legislature did not intend that only
agencies of the city should be covered by the statute, but that those instrumentalities which, though not agents, perform governmental functions for the city should
also be covered. Such an interpretation is in line with the liberal construction
which the New York courts have declared applicable to statutes which grant a
right of inspection of public records.
It is also in line with the words of the statute, "on behalf of." While some
courts have held "for" and "on behalf of" to29be synonymous, others have held that
"on behalf of' does not signify strict agency.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shamberg's Estate3 ° is of particular
significance. The income tax regulations provided that interest from bonds issued
"by or on behalf of" a state should not be included in gross income. The question
in the case was whether bonds of the Port of New York Authority were issued "by
or on behalf of" the state. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certainly did
not find the Port of New York Authority to be the "alter ego" of the state, yet it
held the bonds to be tax exempt. It held that the words "or on behalf of" indicated
an intention that obligations of entities other than the state itself were excluded
from taxes. The test of whether an instrumentality was acting in behalf of a state
was whether the activities of the body were for a public purpose. Furthermore,
the court said that a ruling of the Commissioner had interpreted income from the
bonds of the Triborough Bridge Authority to be excluded from federal income
taxes.31
That the Authority performs a public function hardly need be argued. That
the legislature chose to use broad language in Section 51 is apparent. The courts
clearly favor liberal interpretation when the issue is the right to inspect records.
In light of these factors, the conclusion should have been reached that the Authority
was a board or commission within the meaning of Section 51 and its records subject
to inspection by the petitioning newspaper.
Arthur L. Roule, Jr.

28 In re Rice, 196 F.2d 617 (1947); Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913
(1902).
29 Schimmel v. Mallory S.S. Co., 30 F.2d 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944).
30 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944).
31 Id. at 1006. See also Rev. Rul. 56-33, where bonds of the Indiana Toll Road Commission were ruled as having been issued "on behalf of" the state. The bonds of the New
York State Housing Finance Agency were declared issued "on behalf of" the state in Rev.
Rul. 60-248, after an extended discussion of the agency's relationship with the state.

